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Abstract
It has long been understood that individual and collective identification
are inexorably intertwined. This convergence is not limited to genetics.
This  paper  discusses  the  convergence  of  individual  and  collective
identification  in  a  comparative  analysis  of  three  other  forensic  areas:
fingerprint  analysis,  microscopic  hair  comparison,  and  microbiome
forensics.  In  all  three  case  studies,  we  see  purportedly  individualizing
technologies  reverting,  in  a  sense,  to  collective  identification.
Presumably, this has much to do with the perceived utility of collective
identification. When knowing precisely who is the donor of a trace is not
possible, or not useful, then knowing that the donor is ‘white,’ or ‘black,’
or  ‘Middle  Eastern’  begins  to  seem somehow useful.  In  each case,  we
also  see  that  these  collective  identifications  are  ultimately  founded  on
crude  and  broad,  seemingly  ‘commonsensical’  or  ‘social,’  racial
categories. These categories, meanwhile, are based on a less-than-fully-
transparent combination of self-identification or official ascription. These
suspect  data  are  then  transformed  into  seemingly  persuasive  scientific
claims about  the  genetic  attributes  of  this  or  that  ‘race,’  ‘ethnicity,’  or
‘ancestry.’  Through  this  comparison  the  paper  will  explore  how  the
individual  and  the  collective  are  ‘done’  differently  and  similarly  in
different forensic disciplines.
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Introduction
Individual and collective identification have always been inextricably
intertwined. This seems paradoxical. The purpose of individual
identification, after all, is to distinguish individuals from the full
complement of humanity and even from groups. Yet, all efforts at individual
identification seem to lead inexorably back to group identification.
Presumably, this is because a mass of differentiated—or, to use a term I am
campaigning against, ‘unique’—individuals is not much use for doing
anything. To say that each human individual is unique and different from all
others is, in some sense, banal, to say nothing at all. In order to take any
sort of practical action, the individuals must be reassembled into groups
(Bolnick 2008, p. 71). To give just two examples, the so-called
‘personalized medicine,’ which genetics has promised is on the horizon, is
not really personalized at all, but rather hinges on reassembling individuals
into groups of individuals who share genetic propensities that are more
similar within than between groups. Drugs are not actually going to be
‘individualized.’ Individuals are sorted into (possibly very broad) groups
that may vary in their responsiveness to a particular drug (Hedgecoe 2004).
The efficacy of any ‘personalized’ diagnoses or interventions will be
achieved only statistically across the group. Their utility for any one
individual in the group cannot be guaranteed, or even known. Likewise,
‘individualized’ penological or criminological treatments were not, in fact,
individualized at all. Rather, they depended on sorting individuals into
groups: first-time offenders, recidivists or various sorts, and so on (Cole
2001). Again, efficacy can only be measured statistically across the group.
AQ1
Given the close relationship between identification technologies and various
forensic technologies that likewise aim at individualized identification, it is
little surprise that we observe the same phenomenon in forensic
identification. The best known example is forensic DNA profiling. This
technology is touted as the ultimate identifier, and it has been claimed that
it can distinguish all individuals with the notable exception of homozygous
twins. And, yet, rather than merely becoming an individual identification
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technology, groups reappeared in forensic DNA profiling.
One notable example was the use of population groups for calculating
statistical probabilities for genetic associations. In the early years of DNA
profiling, the construction and use of these population groups was the
subject of fierce controversy (M’charek 2000). Race mattered in forensic
genetics because early statistics for DNA association were calculated under
an assumption of random mating in the human population. This assumption
was widely acknowledged to be false, although the extent to which
correcting it would change the reported statistics was debated (Lynch et al.
2008; Aronson 2007). Today, however, the discriminating power of forensic
DNA profiling has diminished the importance of these debates. And yet, the
use of population groups continues (Kahn 2009). As Kahn has noted, in
forensic genetics the use of race, which was seen as ‘social,’ is sloppy
compared to the care that was taken over procedures seen as ‘natural.’ The
racial data used in American forensic DNA profiling were in some cases
based entirely on self-identification, according to U.S. census categories.
The only legitimate way of interpreting these data is back onto the social
category, not onto a genetic category. In other cases, the basis for racial
classification was not even stated in the scientific papers. However, it seems
likely that in those papers ‘race’ was classified through a combination of
self-identification and official ‘ascription’ of racial identities by law
enforcement authorities. Presumably they do so based on what Hammonds
(1997) called “embodied race”—the assignment of people to a race based
on what they look like. This may be primarily skin tone, but it presumably
is also influenced by other phenotypic features and perhaps even by cultural
features like attire, language, accent, attitude, and so on.
An even more charged use of race in forensic DNA profiling lay in the area
of phenotypic profiling. In this practice, vendors offered a service in which
they predicted the phenotypic attributes of the donor of a DNA sample
whose source is unknown. These predictions were based on Ancestry
Informative Markers (AIMs) (Fullwiley 2008b). This raised a number of
problems including the fact that it proceeded from the gross demarcation of
the human population into a small number (e.g., four) continental
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population groups, searching for AIMs whose frequency differs between
these groups, and then treating frequencies of AIMs as denoters of ‘race,’
‘the heritable component of race,’ or ‘biogeographical ancestry’ (Sankar
2010). Exacerbating this coarse division of the population into continental
groups was the way in which individual research subjects are assigned to
those groups. The assignment of research subjects to racial groups was, as
Cho and Sankar (2004, S9) dryly put it, “often by undescribed methods.” It
seems likely, however, that assignment was, again, done through self-
identification or “by police officers… based on appearance rather than any
knowledge of an individual’s ancestry” (Cho and Sankar 2004, S10).
Recording of race by police has long been routine in, for example, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France (Knepper 1996, p. 86;
Skinner 2013, p. 981). Interestingly, the publication of crime statistics
categorized by race by the FBI in the Uniform Crime Reports in the 1930s
originated from fingerprint cards which contained racial descriptions
(Knepper 1996, pp. 86–87). But these descriptions were presumably based
on official ascription and perhaps self-identification. As LaFree (1995, p.
187) noted, “it seems clear that racial distinctions in most official data are
probably based on… commonsense informed haphazardly and
inconsistently by respondent self-identification.” The recording of race by
police has become controversial in some countries though. It was never
practiced in Canada (Knepper 1996, p. 86), and the U.K. recently
discontinued the recording of ‘ethnic appearance’ as part of the process of
taking DNA samples (Skinner 2013, p. 987). Phenotypic assessments by
police can suffer from “perception bias,” and they apparently correlate
poorly with ancestry measured by genetics (Ossorio 2006, p. 283; Knepper
1996, p. 95). And self-identification changes over time in response to both
internal and external influences (Cho and Sankar 2004, S9). Indeed, the
‘Dolezal affair’ in 2015 in the U.S., in which the President of a chapter of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People who had
presented herself as black was ‘exposed’ as having had white ancestry and
white phenotypic appearance as a child, raised the question of whether
people could, or should, choose to change their ‘race’ in manner completely
untethered to biology (Tuvel 2017; Brubaker 2016). In addition, Ossorio
(2006) has noted that the phenotypic traits of minority populations are
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likely to be of greater interest to the police—because they are rarer and thus
denote a smaller group of suspects—and Staubach et al. (2017) argue that
predictive accuracy diminishes for rarer traits “when adjusted for
prevalence.”
The intertwining of individualization and race in genetics is relatively well
understood precisely because, in contrast to, for example, fingerprints,
genes are widely believed to have both individualizing potential and group
(racial) correlations (Rabinow 1992). But this convergence is not limited to
genetics. This paper discusses the convergence of individual and collective
identification in a comparative analysis of three forensic areas other than
forensic genetics: friction ridge (or ‘fingerprint’) analysis, microscopic hair
comparison, and microbiome forensics. Although this paper is limited to
only three areas, those areas are quite disparate. The vexed relationship
between individual and collective identification in these three areas may
well represent a more fundamental attribute that cuts more broadly across
the fields of forensics and identification. To some extent, of course, these
forensic areas are ‘genetic’ in that the hereditary nature of the examined
features is posited as the explanation for the inferences made from them. In
all three of these case studies, we see purportedly individualizing
technologies reverting, in a sense, to collective identification. Presumably,
this has much to do with the perceived utility of collective identification.
When knowing precisely who is the donor of a trace is not possible, or not
useful, then knowing that the donor is ‘white,’ or ‘black,’ or ‘Middle
Eastern’ begins to seem somehow useful (M’charek 2008).
In each case, we also see that these collective identifications are ultimately
founded on crude and broad, seemingly ‘commonsensical’ or ‘social,’ racial
categories. Scientific claims about these categories, meanwhile, are based
on often less-than-fully-transparent combinations of self-identification or
official ascription. These suspect data are then transformed into seemingly
persuasive scientific claims about the genetic attributes of this or that
‘race,’ ‘ethnicity,’ or ‘ancestry.’ Each of the three cases studies illustrates
the seemingly inescapable persistence of race and gender as collective
identities that continually recur in forensic discourse. Through this
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comparison the paper will explore how the individual and the collective are
‘done’ differently and similarly in different forensic disciplines.
Methodologically, this study is informed by history of science’s preference
for what scientists write and publish over how they explain themselves in,
e.g., an interview setting. Thus, a possible limitation on my findings is that
they draw on textual materials, rather than interviews, and the scientists
have not been permitted the opportunity to ‘speak for themselves’ outside
the confines of their own published work.
Fingerprints
Fingerprint identification is widely believed to have nothing whatsoever to
do with race. It is imagined as “pure identification.” Indeed, it is often cast
as the antithesis of collective identification (Rabinow 1992). As it turns out,
however, this is not the case. Efforts to measure the frequency of fingerprint
pattern types among the groups of interest to the scientists of the day (i.e.,
the nineteenth century, so the groups were ‘races,’ ethnic groups, the sexes,
epileptics, the sane and insane, ‘defectives’ of various types, and so on) are
almost as old, in some cases older, than the uses of fingerprints more
familiar to us today. Rather than ‘failing,’ these efforts found small
correlations between fingerprint pattern types (which are, of course,
constructed categories themselves) and the ascribed groups enumerated
above. These correlations were not ‘wrong,’ so much as they were not very
useful, especially in contrast to the seemingly remarkable utility of
fingerprints for criminal record-keeping and forensic investigation.
Research on group correlations with fingerprint patterns was, therefore,
pushed to the margins, but it never disappeared completely, and, indeed, it
reappeared periodically throughout the twentieth century (e.g., Miller 2003;
Löwy 2014, p. 156).
My purpose in this paper is not to rehearse this history, but rather to discuss
the latest resurgence of this line of research, a paper in the American
Journal of Physical Anthropology (Fournier and Ross 2015), “Sex,
Ancestral, and Pattern Type Variation of Fingerprint Minutiae: A Forensic
Perspective on Anthropological Dematoglyphics.” The article’s objective is
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to close “the gap between researcher–practitioner by examining sex,
ancestral, and pattern type variation of fingerprint minutiae.” It is worth
noting that the authors’ theoretical rationale for studying fingerprints and
ancestry is explicitly genetic:
Inheritance  of  fingerprint  traits  is  polygenic,  which  makes
them less susceptible to stochastic processes such as genetic
drift.  Though  polygenic  traits  are  more  difficult  to
genetically  define,  they  remain  preferable  for  tracing
population relationships because of their stability (3, citation
omitted).
In this sense, the authors are using dermatoglyphics in conjunction with
genetics in much the same way that medical birth defects researchers in the
1960s did (Miller 2003).
The study sample consisted of 243 rolled impressions of right index fingers.
These fingerprints were divided into four groups of approximately 60
fingerprint each, designated “African American” and “European American”
with Male and Female groups for each. As with phenotypic profiling for
DNA (Sankar 2010; Ossorio 2006; Fullwiley 2008a; M’charek 2008), the
question arises how ancestry was assigned to research subjects in the
studies underlying the predictive tools. Once again, we find a combination
of self-identification and official ascription. The article first suggests that it
used National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) software to
determine ancestry:
The  Biometric  Image  Software  (NBIS)  developed  by  the
forensic  science  division  of  the  National  Institute  of
Standards  and  Technology  (NIST)  was  used  to  search  for
individuals  of  European  and  African  American  ancestry.
Once individuals who fit the ancestry needs were identified,
their prints could be searched in the local and state databases
using  PrintQuestVR  AFIS-APIS  System  (4,  citation
omitted).
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This is puzzling because it appears that NBIS cannot be “used to search for
individuals of European and African American ancestry.”  The article then
states that ancestry was coded according to self-identification and official
ascription:
Once a fingerprint was determined to be of sufficient quality,
sex  and  ancestry  were  ascertained  based  on  self-
identification  on  the  individual’s  record.  Ancestry
information, therefore, was based on a priori knowledge of
self-identification  and  demographic  information  of  Wake
County,  NC.  Specifically,  only  those  individuals  who self-
identified as “white” or “black” were chosen for the study,
racial  groups  that  make  up  62.2  and  20.3%  of  the  2010
population  of  Wake  County,  respectively  (4–5,  citation
omitted).
This treatment of race as a dichotomous variable is curious given that the
researchers elsewhere have made clear their awareness that a large and
increasing portion of the human population can be characterized as
“admixed” (Ross 2011).
AQ2
The researchers then counted the occurrence of each of five designated
minutiae types (bifurcations, ridge endings, short ridges, enclosures, and
dots) in each of the 243 fingerprints. The study question was whether any of
the minutiae counts predicted sex or ancestry. This focus on minutiae in
some sense constituted the novelty of the study. Most prior dermatoglyphic
studies had focused on gross pattern type (i.e., arch, loop, whorl) rather than
minutiae (e.g., Bonnevie 1924).
The answer was that one minutiae type, “bifurcations,” was found to be a
“significant predictor of ancestry” (6). It is perhaps worth considering the
raw data behind this claim in simplified form. Table 1 reports the mean
values and standard deviation of the variable “total bifurcations” for each of
the four groups, rounded to one decimal place.
1
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Table 1
Adapted from Fournier and Ross (2015)
Group Total bifurcations Standard deviation
European American males 21.6 1.2
European American females 19.1 1.1
African American males 23.1 1.3
African American females 24.1 1.4
Table 1 shows that most humans have around 20 bifurcations, but “African
Americans” have slightly more. African American males have around 1.5
more bifurcations than European American, which is just over 1 standard
deviation more. African American females have around 5 more bifurcations
than European American which could be as high as 4 standard deviations
more. From these data, the paper concludes that “The odds ratio of 5.61
signifies that African Americans are nearly six times more likely to have
bifurcations than European Americans” (6). The wording of the claim is
difficult to follow if read literally. Given an average of more than 20
bifurcations across all subjects, presumably all subject were very, very
“likely to have bifurcations,” and African Americans could not possibly be
six times more likely. In fact, the claim means is that each additional
bifurcation above the mean (of around 22) multiplies by 5.61 the odds that
the subject is “African American.” However, the study also shows that total
bifurcations are a rather poor predictor of self-identified race. Using total
bifurcations to classify “race,” around 42% of the subjects classified as
“African American” according to total bifurcations turned out to self-
identify as “European American.” And, around 43% of the subjects
classified as “European American” according to total bifurcations turned
out to self-identify as “African American.”
In short, the study began by sorting people according to a social category
(self-reported “race). They then measured some biological characteristics to
see if they differed according to that social category. They, then chose the
2
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biological characteristic that seemed to differ the most and tested their
ability to sort people according to that characteristic. They then tried to map
this sorting back onto the social category, and found it did so poorly. And,
yet the findings are still presented as having told us something about the
possibility of predicting “real” race, i.e., membership in a biological, not
social, category.
The paper then goes on to suggest that its findings could be used to generate
a method for fingerprints analogous to phenotypic profiling for DNA
(Sankar 2010):
The logistic regression results suggest that bifurcations can
be used to classify individuals into ancestry groups, a finding
that could lend support to the use of statistical models based
on  the  total  number  of  bifurcations  present  to  estimate
biological information regarding the individual who leaves a
latent  fingerprint,  in  conjunction  with  point-by-point
inspections in latent fingerprint comparison (7).
In other words, given an unidentified crime scene print, bifurcation-
counting may allow for a binary European/African prediction of the donor’s
ancestry, or, more precisely, the donor’s self-assigned ‘race.’ If this
information were used in a criminal identification, it would presumably be
used to tell law enforcement to look for someone of a certain ‘race.’ But,
the phenotypic (and socio-cultural) features that such an instruction would
presumably trigger in law enforcement might not be the same as those
which caused the individuals in the study to self-identify as one ‘race’ of
the other. And the overabundance of bifurcations that the study found
correlates with the latter, not the former. The only legitimate way of
interpreting these correlations is back onto the social category, not onto a
genetic category. For instance, it might be legitimate to conclude that “this
fingerprint is more likely to come from a person who self-identifies as
African American, given the binary choice between African and European
American.” It would not, however, be legitimate to conclude that the
fingerprint is more likely to come from a person from a particular genetic or
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ancestral category—that is, a person whose ancestors predominantly came
from the geographical entities ‘Africa’ or ‘Europe.’
But the potential applications for forensic investigation do not end there:
It  is  argued  here  that  predictive  models  have  potential  as
corroborative evidence to substantiate the decisions made by
latent fingerprint examiners during fingerprint comparisons,
especially  if  some  of  the  more  rare  minutia  types  are
discovered to vary among other populations, as these would
be weighted more heavily in fingerprint comparisons (7).
If I understand this claim correctly, the researchers are suggesting that, after
a latent print examiner makes a decision that a particular individual is the
source of a particular latent print, this decision could be corroborated by a
bifurcation-count. Presumably what is meant is that if the bifurcation-count
correctly predicts the ‘ancestry’ of the individual the latent print examiner
decided was the donor of the latent print, this would provide corroboration
for the examiner’s decision. This suggestion is rather outlandish in itself,
but it raises the further question of how the ancestry of the identified
individual would be determined. The paper does not say, leading one to
assume that ancestry would be attributed by law enforcement based on
visual assessment and other cues (e.g., voice, accent, vocabulary, attire,
behavior).
Pushing this argument even further, the researchers suggest that they may
be able to thus “minimize the error rate involved with making
identifications” (8), a suggestion that many latent print examiners might
regard as surprising if not outlandish, given that, until recently, they
believed that there was no error rate for latent print identification at all
(Cole, 2005). Even now that many latent print examiners have abandoned
that claim, they still might recoil at the idea of corroborating a latent print
decision by reference to dermatoglyphics combined with visual ancestry
ascription.
The limited practical significance of corroborating a fingerprint association
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with an ancestry analysis suggests that dermatoglyphics may be a hammer
in search of a nail. It may be an example of what Kahn (2009, p. 355)
observed about race in forensic DNA profiling: “race is used because it is
perceived as scientific—even if not of practical significance.”
These seemingly outlandish suggestions, however, become more
understandable when we recall that the framework of the paper is to
integrate two seemingly disparate disciplines that both have fingerprints as
their object of study: anthropology and forensic science. As the authors
note, anthropologists have tended to focus on fingerprint pattern types in an
effort to correlate them with race, ethnicity, gender, disease, criminality, and
other behavioral traits, whereas forensic scientists have focused on finer
details, the so-called minutiae (ridge endings, bifurcations, etc.). The
authors proposed to study minutiae anthropologically. “Given the
applicability of ridge traits to a forensic and anthropological context,” the
authors write, “it is argued here that these traits should be studied from both
perspectives, ideally through collaboration (1)… [Y]et anthropologists and
forensic scientists rarely collaborate in their efforts” (4).
While the paper’s claims seem rather strong, they were in fact modest
compared to their characterization in the media. A North Carolina State
University press release was entitled: “Study: Ancestral Background Can
Be Determined by Fingerprints.” Already, we can see that the claims are
being presented in the press release as stronger than even the strongest
claims found in the scientific paper, as indicated by the use of the word
“determined.” The press release goes on to state that “it is possible to
identify an individual’s ancestral background based on his or her fingerprint
characteristics.” It characterizes this as “a discovery with significant
applications for law enforcement and anthropological research.” Gone is the
speculative tone in the scientific paper, which said, for example, that it
“could lend support to the use of statistical models” (7). Only in the second
paragraph of the press release do we learn that “more work needs to be
done,” that we need larger sample sizes, and to study more than two
ancestral groups. In addition to the standard hyping found in many
university press releases, it may be argued that this one, like many others,
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heightens the popular appeal of its claims through its reference to race
(ancestry), this drawing on the ever-present popular interest in claims that
genetic or racial categories ‘explain’ human differences.
Yet even the strong claims in the press release pale in comparison to the
claims in the media coverage prompted by the press release. The press
release generated media coverage as far away as Italy. While one report did
tone down the “determined” language in the press release by writing “latent
prints can provide clues to a person’s race,” it also hyped the study by
calling this “an astounding conclusion” (Augenstein 2015). The first author
of the scientific paper is quoted stating “The results show that minutiae can
tell us the probable ancestry of a person who leaves behind a latent
fingerprint” and “This information is valuable evidence to corroborate the
conclusion of a match based on a point-by-point comparison by a latent
fingerprint examiner.”
A second report summarized the study this way: “There’s a new way for
you to check your ancestry—look at your thumb” (Scribner 2015). It stated
that the paper “suggests that one’s ancestral background can be determined
based on the characteristics of their thumbprint” and that the researchers
“said their findings suggest that one’s thumbprint can determine where their
[sic] ancestors came from.”
A third media report advised readers to “Forget all of those expensive DNA
tests that claim to reveal your ancestry because a new proof-of-concept
study by researchers at North Carolina State University and Washington
State University demonstrates how a person’s background can be identified
using his/her fingerprints” (Bednar 2015).
As this last report suggests, perhaps the appeal of this news story is the way
in which the seemingly humble fingerprint beats its more technically
sophisticated rival at its own game: being the “code of life.” If fingerprints
can reveal ancestry too, they take DNA off its pedestal. Ironically, however,
for criminal justice purposes, DNA wants off the pedestal: the acceptance of
DNA as a criminal justice tool depends to some extent on reassuring the
public about its lack of ability to predict biological futures.
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Microscopic hair comparison
The second case study derives from the forensic discipline of microscopic
hair comparison. Microscopic hair comparison has a long history, but it is
beginning to fall into disrepute in the United States (e.g., Covey 2018).
While it was already known that a large number of post-conviction DNA
exonerations derived from cases in which microscopic hair comparison
contributed to the wrongful conviction (Garrett 2011), the recent
controversy was prompted by the exposure by the Washington Post of three
wrongful convictions obtained in part by microscopic hair comparison (Hsu
2012). Partly in response, a joint review by the Department of Justice
(DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Innocence Project
(IP), and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)
was created to review cases in which microscopic hair comparison was
used. In 2015, the group released the results of this panel’s initial analysis
of almost 500 cases. Most startlingly, it reported that FBI examiners gave
“inaccurate” testimony in 96% of those cases. The DOJ is now working to
notify all the defendants affected. The NACDL is trying to ensure that those
defendants have counsel. For its part, the FBI has agreed to provide free
DNA testing, and the DOJ has agreed not to invoke statutes of limitations.
However, that will not necessarily apply to the majority of cases, which
originated in state, not federal, courts.
That attention-getting 96% statistic is likely behind some of the rather
sensational headlines that accompanied blog posts about the report,
including, for example, “The FBI faked an entire field of forensic science”
(Lithwick 2015) and “CSI is a Lie” (Friedersdorf 2015). One might read
such reports and wonder how it is even possible to be wrong at a rate so
much higher than chance. This story is perhaps a particularly stark example
of what is by now a rather garden-variety finding in sociology of science:
that scientific knowledge changes through the social consensus of its
practitioners. By deliberately forming an organized consensus group and
charging themselves with issuing a report, the four institutions (DOJ, FBI,
IP, NACDL), former adversaries, whose cooperation, as Reimer (2013),
Executive Director of NACDL, put it, was “once an almost inconceivable
concept,” were able to transform thousands of scientific results from
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“accurate” to “inaccurate.” When the report calls testimony “inaccurate,” it
does not mean that it falsely associated a hair with an individual. Rather, it
means that the expert witnesses overstated the value of evidence, sometimes
by claiming that the suspect was the only possible source of the hair rather
than one of many possible sources, sometimes by attaching bogus statistics
to a hair association.
Notably, for our purposes, many of these overstatements were claims of
‘individualization’—the claim to be able to associate a crime scene hair
with a single donor. What the reviewing institutions had agreed was that
such claims could never be sustained for hair comparison (though they are
still claimed for other forensic areas, such as fingerprints and toolmarks).
Instead, hairs could only be associated with a group, and, further, in most
cases the size of that group was considered unknown, and indeed
unknowable. Yet, for years, FBI examiners had treated a forensic technique
with relatively low discrimination as if were capable of such high
discrimination that it could reduce the potential donor pool of a hair to a
single individual.
The science didn’t ‘shift.’ In fact, no scientific research was performed at
all—that, after all, is the point. What happened was that relevant actors
became convinced that is was not scientifically acceptable to report about a
hair comparison without making a reliable estimate of the potential donor
population. In essence, the relevant social actors agreed it was necessary to
think about hair evidence in a probabilistic fashion. This formation of
agreement could reasonably be called both a scientific act and a social one.
There is a possible explanation for this unusual turn of events: microscopic
hair comparison is almost obsolete. As a National Research Council report
noted:
The availability  of  DNA analysis  has lessened the reliance
on  hair  examination.  In  a  very  high  proportion  of  cases
involving hair evidence, DNA can be extracted, even years
after  the  crime  has  been  committed.  Although  the  DNA
extraction may consist of only mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA)
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[nuclear DNA, preferable for forensic analysis, is not always
retrievable from hair;  mitochondrial  DNA usually is],  such
analyses  are  likely  to  be  much  more  specific  than  those
conducted on the physical features of hair.  For this reason,
cases  that  might  have  relied  heavily  on  hair  examinations
have  been  subjected  more  recently  to  additional  analyses
using  DNA.  Because  of  the  inherent  limitations  of  hair
comparisons and the availability of higher-quality and higher
accuracy  analyses  based  on  mtDNA,  traditional  hair
examinations may be presented less often as evidence in the
future, although microscopic comparison of physical features
will  continue  to  be  useful  for  determining  which  hairs  are
sufficiently similar to merit comparisons with DNA analysis
and  for  excluding  suspects  and  assisting  in  criminal
investigations.
The joint review was concerned with overstatements of the discriminability
of hair comparison, not with ancestry attribution through hair. Nonetheless,
many of the cases that were reviewed did contain statements about ancestry
because hair examiners, traditionally, have made attributions of ancestry as
well as individuality. In one capital case in Florida, the defense argument
was that two other individuals, who happened to be Mexican, had
committed the murder, but the hair analyst testified that Mexicans could be
ruled out as sources of a hair (Antoun 2017).
The most dramatic case involving ancestry attribution was that of Willie
Manning. At the time the joint project was underway, Willie Manning had
an imminent execution date, May 7, 2013. Manning had been convicted and
sentenced to death in two separate double murders in Mississippi, the 1992
murder of Tiffany Miller and Jon Steckler and the 1993 murder of Alberta
Jordan and Emmoline Jimmerson (Cohen 2013). During the trial for the
Miller-Steckler murder, an FBI hair analyst testified that a hair recovered
from their car came from a black person. Miller and Steckler were white
(Possley 2015). The analyst did not ‘individualize’ Manning as the source
of that hair or provide a quantitative statement about the weight of the
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evidence. But the analyst did—falsely—state that microscopic hair
comparison was capable of both these things, which, arguably may have
improperly increased the jury’s perception of the power of the technique.
Given Manning’s impending execution, the FBI took the unusual step of
issuing urgent letters on May 4, 2013 stating that there were errors in the
hair evidence in Manning’s case (Cohen 2013). The letters held that it had
been error to report that a black person was the source of the hair, but still
insisted that it was appropriate to report that hair “exhibits traits associated
with a particular racial group”:
The scientific analysis of hair evidence permits an examiner
to offer an opinion that a questioned hair possesses certain
traits  that  are  associated  with  a  particular  racial  group.
However, since a statistical probability cannot be determined
for  classification  of  hair  into  a  particular  racial  group,  it
would  be  error  for  an  examiner  to  testify  that  he  can
determine that the questioned hairs were from an individual
of a particular racial group. Thus, an examiner cannot testify
with any statement of probability whether the hair is from a
particular  racial  group,  but  can  testify  that  a  hair  exhibits
traits  associated  with  a  particular  racial  group  (Federal
Bureau of Investigation 2013).
Four hours before his scheduled execution, Manning was granted a stay of
execution in order to allow DNA testing on the hair. In 2015, Manning was
exonerated of the Jordan-Jimmerson murder after key witnesses had
recanted their original testimony and Manning’s lawyers discovered that the
witnesses had lied about living in the same building as the victims.
Manning remains on death row for the Miller-Steckler murder (Possley
2015).
All of this is seems to suggest that microscopic hair comparison is in
trouble. Nonetheless, the DOJ did recently issue a Proposed Uniform
Language for Testimony and Reports (ULTR) for the Forensic Hair
Examination Discipline (Department of Justice 2016a). The ULTRs are a
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project that actually stemmed from the hair comparison review. The DOJ
decided to do more such reviews for other forensic disciplines. As I noted
above, however, carrying out such reviews requires pre-agreement on
‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ testimony. Therefore, the DOJ has
committed to producing ULTRs for a range of forensic disciplines. Hair
comparison was included in the first batch of draft ULTRs.
As with the FBI statement in the Manning case, the draft ULTR took the
position that ancestry assignments are still appropriate, using a common
crude—and arbitrary (Bolnick 2008)—three-race format:
Characteristics of Ancestry The examiner may state or imply
that  a human hair  exhibits  Caucasian (European Ancestry),
Negroid  (African  Ancestry)  and/or  Mongoloid  (Asian  or
Native American Ancestry) characteristics.  Ancestral group
classifications are based on characteristics that are typically
observed  in  hairs  from  individuals  of  different  ancestral
groups  and  may  or  may  not  correspond  with  how  an
individual identifies his or her race.
This raises the question whether these claims are, like others we discussed
above, based on studies that rely on crude racial classification, self-
identification, and official ascription. The Supporting Documentation for
the ULTR stated:
Ancestral  group classifications  are  based on characteristics
that  are  typically  observed  in  hairs  from  individuals  of
different  ancestral  groups  and  may  or  may  not  correspond
with  how  an  individual  identifies  his  or  her  race.
Characteristics  of  ancestry  can  often  be  determined  using
features  such  as  pigment  distribution  and  cross-sectional
shape (Department of Justice 2016b, pp. 5–6).
Ancestry groups are treated as ‘scientifically real’ and thus transcending
both ‘social race’ and self-identification. The document offers two citations
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in support of this statement (Franbourg et al. 2003; Khumalo et al. 2000).
The first study used “African,” “Caucasian,” and “Asian” volunteers, but
does not explain how volunteers were assigned to these groups. Notably, it
found that “Chemical analysis has shown no major biochemical differences
the various racial groups” (Khumalo et al. 2000, p. 814). The second study
merely reports that hair samples coded “African” were taken from subjects
living in France or the U.S., those coded “Asian” were taken from China or
Japan, and those coded “white” were taken from Europe or Canada. Of
course, this is a remarkably old fashioned conception of race that seems to
selectively ignore migration. This study found that “African” hairs were
different in structure, exhibited more knots, and were more often broken
than hairs from other groups.
Interestingly, the ULTR did acknowledge that the crude ancestral groups it
proposes “may or may not correspond with how an individual identifies his
or her race.” Thus, it acknowledged the ‘social’ nature of ‘race,’ but failed
to address the impact that this might have on the scientific studies that
supposedly support the claimed ability to make racial classifications.
Is this yet another finding founded on unwarranted assumptions about the
researchers’ ability to accurately sort their research subjects into ancestry?
As it turns out, dermatologists have already been questioning the
assignment of race in this way. In 2006, the Journal of the American
Academy of Dermatology published a “Colloquium on Race/Ethnicity/Skin
Color.” In it, researchers analyzed the way in which race, ethnicity, and skin
color had been reported in the journal. They found that race of patient was
mentioned in 41% of case reports published in the journal. Perhaps not
surprisingly, they found that the way in which race was determined was
simply not reported in a full three quarters of these case reports. In the
remainder, race was determined by self-identification. No studies stated that
race was determined by inspection (Unaeze and Bigby 2006, p. 1068). Two
editors of the journal published a “Proposed Policy on Identification of
Race, Ethnicity or Skin Color in Case Reports and Studies Submitted to the
Journal of the American Academy of Dermatology” (Unaeze and Bigby
2006). The editors concluded that “Rather than a policy, we suggest that
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authors inclined to include such descriptions in their manuscripts ask
themselves the following questions:
1. Is the identification of the patient’s race/ethnicity/skin color important
to the understanding or pedagogical value of the submitted
manuscript?
2. Would the patient identify him/herself in the same way as the authors
have (and how do you know)?
3. Might the descriptor be open to racist intent or interpretation?
4. What is the evidence that the race/ethnicity/color of the patient(s)
plays a role in the entities described?”
Although the editors clearly have concerns beyond merely the assumption
that race can be inferred from self-identification or official ascription, it is
clear that is among their concerns. Elsewhere in the same issue, in a letter
entitled “Describing Patients’ ‘Race’ in Clinical Presentations Should be
Abandoned,” one of the editors and co-author note:
Generally in practice, the physician decides the race of the
patient  on  the  basis  of  what  he/she  sees  and  his/her  own
biases. For most physicians, if he/she can’t decide, anxiety is
generated. The assessment of race is often wrong or at least
at  odds  with  what  the  patient  considers  him/herself.  This
conflict  is  absurd  because  there  are  no  definitive  tests  or
definitions  of  the  term race  (Bigby and Bernhard 2006,  p.
1075, citations omitted).
In another contribution to the colloquium, one of the authors of one of the
studies noted above, which was cited by the DOJ ULTR to support the
proposition that hair examiners can predict ancestry, notes that “[f]or
example, the definition of ‘African hair’ is important because this hair form
is associated with a higher prevalence of specific disorders (e.g., acne
keloidalis).” However, he argues:
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that race is in fact only a proxy for hair form. Within groups
of  ‘‘African’’  and  ‘‘Asian’’  hair  reside  extremes  of  the
spectrum of  hair  morphology,  with  the  majority,  typical  of
human  variation,  falling  within  these  extremes.  Even
indigenous Africans in Africa display variations in hair form.
I agree with Bigby et al. that race should be abandoned, and
whilst  it  is  a  useful,  albeit  nonspecific,  surrogate  for  hair
form, its use suggests a lack of rigor on our part (Khumalo
2007, p. 709).
Therefore, the letter is titled “Yes, Let’s Abandon Race–It Does not
Accurately Correlate with Hair Form.”
Even the famous Afro-American Studies scholar Henry Louis Gates, Jr.
weighed in on the dermatological controversy. Contrary to the arguments
expressed above, Gates (2006) expressed support for Taylor (2006, p.
1070), who argued, based on “the study of the Human Genome Diversity
Cell Line Panel, the concept of race has seemingly been demonstrated to be
more than simply a social construct, but indeed to be firmly grounded in
biology.” This is generally consistent with Gates’s well known enthusiasm
for exploring ancestry through the combination of genetics and history
(Williams 2009), which has sometimes appeared to science studies scholars
to verge on determinism (Pollock 2012, p. 108).
Given the above discussion, it would seem that the DOJ Supporting
Documentation for the ULTR does not accurately reflect the current state of
the field concerning the prediction of race from hairs. The citations that it
offers are fairly dated, and sentiment within dermatology—including by the
first author of one of the two articles cited in the Supporting Documentation
—presently seems to be leaning toward describing the full continuum of
hair morphology without using ‘race’ as an arbitrary way to create break
points along that continuum.
As in the first case study, the slippage between biological and social
categories is striking. It is entirely unclear what statements like “the hair did
e.Proofing http://eproofing.springer.com/journals_v2/printpage.php?token...
22 of 44 11/20/18, 1:25 PM
(or did not) come from a ‘Mexican’ or ‘a black person’ is supposed to
mean. Are these social categories, such as ‘a person who lived their
childhood within the national boundaries of the country called Mexico’ or
‘a person who in the 21 -century United States is referred to as “black”’? If
so, how can the scientist countenance the careless construal of these social
categories as biological? Or, are these statements shorthand for more
precisely defined biological categories such as ‘an ancestry group defined to
capture a large portion of the current population of Mexico’ or ‘an ancestry
group defined to capture individuals who ancestors several generations back
lived in Africa’? If so, how can the scientist countenance the careless
construal of these biological categories as social?
Even trying to found such claims on a more secure base of empirical data
will be difficult because, as the dermatological literature points out, the
empirical data all rest upon the assumption that self-identified ‘race’
correlates with categorical types of hair form.
We see a number of contrasts between the hair case and fingerprint case.
While the fingerprint article discussed above was framed as a scientifically
valid finding that was of questionable practical significance, hair
comparison is “perceived as of practical significance—even if not
scientific” (Kahn 2009, p. 355). Even it is recognized that hair exists along
a continuum of difference, it is claimed that it is still of practical utility to
say that there was a ‘black’ or ‘Mexican’ hair at a crime scene. Whereas
friction ridge analysis has largely abandoned the collective identification
project in order to more vigorously pursue the individual identification
project, hair identification has now abandoned the individual identification
project but retained the collective identification project.
The final Approved ULTR was published by the DOJ in 2018 (Department
of Justice 2018). The Supporting Documentation has apparently been
discarded for all ULTRs and has not been published. Unlike the Draft
ULTR, the approved document makes no mention of characteristics of
ancestry.
Microbiome forensics
st
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My third case study is the emerging area of ‘microbiome forensics.’ The
“human microbiome” refers to “both the collection of genes contained in
the microbes inhabiting the human body… and the collection of different
microbe species inhabiting the human body, analogous to the ‘biome,’
meaning the various species of flora and fauna living in a given
environment, which in this case happens to be the human body” (Nothern
2016, p. 722). Non-human microbiomes—the flora and fauna living on
objects and in environments—are of interest as well.
Microbiomes have emerged as an area of great scientific interest especially
in health research. However, there is also interest in forensic applications.
Some have suggested that the microbiome may “transform the field of law
by its use in tracking and identifying criminals” (Salyards 2015, p. 58) or
that it “could revolutionize future forensic investigations in much the same
way DNA analysis changed investigative procedures two decades ago,” and
“may become the biggest advance in forensic science since the advent of
DNA matching” (Steussy et al. 2015, p. 4, 11). Not surprisingly, human
microbiomes have been characterized as “as unique as fingerprints”
(Benezra 2016, p. 346). Enthusiasts have suggested that “Microbiomes are
as unique as DNA, but since microbiomes are inadvertently left behind
everywhere, they may help make tracking and catching criminals easier
than DNA analysis,” and “microbiomes will always be present” at crime
scenes “and are impossible to conceal, which could have profound
implications for the field of forensics” (Salyards 2015, pp. 59–60). Strong
claims about the supposed uniqueness of each individual’s microbiome are
being made (Steussy et al. 2015, p. 11; Costello et al. 2009; Fierer et al.
2010). Among the potential applications envisioned for microbiome
forensics are estimation of time of death, time in water, personal
identification (i.e., linking a person to an object, place, or another person
through a microbial trace), identification of body fluid type, soil analysis,
identification of infectious strains, and “estimating the human niche of
epithelial cells” (Kuiper 2016, p. 1085; Steussy et al. 2015).
The human microbiome can be a very rich source of genetic information.
One estimate holds that each human microbiome consists of around 100
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trillion cells (Nothern 2016, p. 723). Initially, it was claimed that non-
human cells in and on the human body outnumbered human cells by a factor
of 10 (e.g., Costello et al. 2009, p. 1694).  This rather startling claim
produced some philosophical musing about human identity, casting doubt
on the “monogenomic” notion—so central to genetic forensics—of the
human individual as defined as an agglomeration cells that are all
genetically identical with one another and yet genetically different from the
agglomerated cells of every other entity called a ‘human body’ (Dupré and
O’Malley 2007, p. 842; Sapp 2007, p. 792). Perhaps instead, these
seemingly special identical-yet-unique cells are in fact mere passengers—or
mere parasites—on a much larger cacophony of different species and
individual organisms (e.g., Gregory and Bowker 2016, p. 212; Hutter et al.
2015; Dupré and O’Malley 2007, p. 840; Landecker 2015, p. 257). Further,
this perspective threatens to destabilize the longstanding orientation of
forensics around the centralizing ideal of ‘uniqueness’ (Kirk 1963; Cole
2009) as scientists are beginning to find that microbes, far from being
unique to particular places, are in fact ubiquitous: “the figure of the unique
microbe is being swamped by the ubiquity of microbial presence” (Paxson
and Helmreich 2014, p. 176).
Forensic microbial analysis is based on a ‘metagenomic’  analysis of the
genetic material contained in a swab taken from, say, human skin or a
computer keyboard. Most forensic applications analyze the sample for an
DNA sequence called 16s that encodes for RNA in the cell (for a brief
history, see Sapp 2007). Thus, what is yielded by the analysis is perhaps
thousands of 16s DNA sequences from “hundreds of millions of gene reads”
(Benezra 2016, p. 342). To what extent these sequences represent discrete
individuals or even distinct species (or taxa) is a question that must be
tackled through analytic methods. In principle, this is true of forensic DNA
profiling as well, especially mixtures. However, even the very complex
DNA mixture samples which have famously bedeviled forensic statisticians
(see, e.g., Dror and Hampikian 2011; Thompson et al. 2012; Moss 2015;
Murphy 2015), consist of, say, three to five human individuals. Microbiome
samples consist of thousands of different organisms from many different
species or taxa. Thus, forensic microbial analysis could be conceived as
5
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reflecting the perspective of some philosophers of biology “that the
communal gene pool is evolutionarily important and that genetic material
can fruitfully be thought of as the community resource for a superorganism
or metaorganism, rather than the exclusive property of individual
organisms” (Dupré and O’Malley 2007, p. 838).
Forensic microbial analyses begin by trying to make sense of the thousands
of sampled 16s sequences. This is done by “clustering” the sequences
according to their similarity with one another. 16s sequences which
duplicate to some arbitrary degree (97 and 99% being the most common)
are treated as belonging to a common Operational Taxonomic Unit (OTU).
As the name suggests, OTUs are used a sort of convenience proxy for
‘species,’ while avoiding any claim that members of the same OTU are
members of the same species in any strong epistemological sense.
Microbiology has a long history of treating the “fixed and immutable
bacterial species” as an “idea” that is “required” for “orderly investigation,”
rather than an epistemologically determined object (Attenborough 2012, p.
58; see also Sapp 2007, p. 791). OTUs are then discussed as if they were
‘species,’ although it is understood that some members of the same OTU
may in fact be different ‘species,’ and for that matter a small number of
members of different OTUs may be the same species.
Different samples can be compared in terms of their overlap in OTUs.
Whereas forensic DNA profiling is founded on claims about genetic
material in different samples deriving from the same organism or a few of
the same organisms, microbial forensics is founded on claims about the
similarity of an entire microbial “community” in different samples. In this
sense, microbial identification is ‘collective’ in a way that conventional
DNA profiling is not. It essentially tries to produce individual identity
through a very large group identity. Microbial identities, in this sense, are
hardly individual identities at all. They are individual in the sense that they
pertain to a particular keyboard or to a particular area of human skin (at a
particular time). But, they are collective identities in that they are
constructed out of sequences derived from multiple organisms and even
species.
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While it is possible to construct a microbial similarity metric based on the
degree of overlap of OTUs contained in different samples alone, most
microbial forensics papers do not use such metrics. 16s, the most commonly
used genetic marker for forensic microbial analyses, was initially developed
because of its utility for studying evolution—for measuring the distance
between an organism (or species) and an ancestor (Sommerlund 2006, pp.
918–920). Perhaps for this reason, the more common practice is to use a
‘phylogenetic’ metric of similarity, such as UniFrac, which measures the
evolutionary distance between OTUs in a sample and a common genetic
ancestor. Thus, the sample, consisting of a mixture of a large number of
species and even larger number of individual organisms, is characterized
according its collective estimated evolutionary distance from a common
microbial ancestor (e.g., Lax et al. 2015; Fierer et al. 2010). The ‘identities’
of microbial samples, then, are not merely ‘collective’; they implicate
evolutionary theory. In this way, these collective microbial identities
resemble the collective human identities, such as ‘race,’ discussed in the
previous two case studies. Both are constructed around the supposed
evolutionary distance of groups of organisms from some presumed common
ancestor organism.
Microbiome forensics is expected to use such phylogenetic analyses. For
this reason, microbiome forensics is unlikely to produce ‘matches’ of the
kind found in single-source human DNA analysis in which some specified
number of alleles (e.g., 13) are identical between two samples. Likewise
microbiome forensics is unlikely to use a statistic like the random match
probability to characterize the rarity of those identical alleles. Instead the
analysis will be phylogenetic and probabilistic:
In  the  final  analysis,  phylogenetic  analysis  underpins
virtually all microbial forensic work. There will likely never
be  a  direct  match  between  populations  of  microbes.
Consequently,  it  will  always  be  necessary  to  build  an
evolutionary  tree  through  phylogenetic  computations  to
determine  how  close  the  relatedness  is  between  different
populations.  Alternatively,  populations  of  millions  of
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microbes  may  be  compared  at  one  time  to  find  matching
communities. In all cases, “matching” will never reveal the
samples to be identical but rather so closely related that they
can be used to discriminate between hypotheses put forward
by court (Steussy et al. 2015, p. 26).
Even a finding of a high degree of phylogenetic similarity, however, would
not address the question of how rare that phylogenetic profile is. Human
DNA analysis addresses this question through reference to databases, and
answering that question for microbial forensics would require “analyzing a
representative number of microbiomes and building a database with
relevant samples” (Kuiper 2016, p. 1086). Such databases do not currently
exist (Steussy et al. 2015, p. 35, 44). Some legal scholars, however, have
suggested that microbiome databases would pose a greater threat to privacy
that the human DNA databases that currently exist. This is based on the
argument that human DNA reveals only identity [which is not entirely
correct (Joh 2006; Cole 2007)], whereas microbial DNA may reveal
‘lifestyle’ information, such as diet, health, location, substance use, or
sexual practices (Salyards 2015, p. 73). In contrast to human DNA
databases, microbiome forensics will face the challenge that microbiomes
vary across both time and space: a specific individual’s microbiome is
constantly changing, and different parts of a single human’s body contain
different microbiomes (Costello et al. 2009). Steussy et al. (2015, p. 12)
note that “microbes are constantly dying, reproducing, and occasionally
undergoing mutations and other types of genetic change. Since bacterial
cells can reproduce themselves in as little as 15 min and viruses usually
within less than 24 h, their genomes may exhibit substantial differences in a
very short time. A single day in the life of such a bacterial colony can
produce as many generations as humans have since the time of the
Peloponnesian Wars, 2500 years ago.” These issues could make microbiome
databases much more difficult to construct and manage than human DNA
databases (Nothern 2016, p. 746; Steussy et al. 2015, p. 35, 44).
As with human DNA forensics and most other forensic identification
techniques, the notion of classifying these supposedly highly
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individualizing microbiomes by race has already arisen (Steussy et al. 2015,
p. 43; Gunn and Pitt 2012, p. 321). If these claims are traced back to their
source, we arrive at a 2011 study of vaginal microbiomes. Although this
particular study was motivated by health applications, it should be noted
that researchers have already targeted the vaginal microbiome as potentially
important in the forensic investigation of sexual assaults (Nothern 2016, p.
736). The researchers were interested in the vaginal microbiome because,
they argued, it seemed “to play a key role in preventing a number of
urogenital diseases, such as bacterial vaginosis, yeast infections, sexually
transmitted infections, urinary tract infections, and HIV infection,” and
“Common wisdom attributes this to lactic acid-producing bacteria, mainly
Lactobacillus” (Ravel et al. 2011, p. 4680). The 396 research subjects were
classified into four “ethnic” groups: “white,” “black,” “Hispanic,” and
“Asian.” [As Ross (2011), an author of the fingerprint case study discussed
in Section II, notes, “Hispanic” is not a biological category. It refers to
“people who come from Spanish speaking countries.”] The study found
statistically significant differences in the microbiomes of the four ethnic
groups. Most significantly, Hispanic and black women had a lower
prevalence of Lactobacillus. Although the hosting of Lactobacillus is
considered healthy, the study rejects the notion that black and Hispanic
women are less healthy and instead proposes we rethink “the question of
what kinds of bacterial communities should be considered ‘normal’ in
Hispanic and black women.” The study notes that “The reasons for these
differences among ethnic groups are unknown, but it is tempting to
speculate that the species composition of vaginal communities could be
governed by genetically determined differences in hosts” (Ravel et al. 2011,
p. 4684). Thus, the ‘temptation’ of genetic determinism outweighs
consideration of, for example, environmental or lifestyle explanations for
these individual differences.
We then turn to the question of how the racial classification of the subjects
was accomplished. Again, the answer is that “ethnicity” was “self-reported”
(Ravel et al. 2011, p. 4680). As with the fingerprint case study, this study
began by creating human groups based on a social category, self-identified
‘race.’ It then sought correlations between these groups and a phenotypic
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feature whose potential as an ancestry predictor has been hitherto
unexplored. The only legitimate way of interpreting these correlations is
back onto the social category, not onto a genetic category. For instance, it
might be legitimate to conclude that “this microbiome is more likely to
come from a woman who self-identifies as black or Hispanic, using U.S.
Census categories.” It would not, however, be legitimate to conclude that
the microbiome is more likely to come from a woman from a particular
genetic or ancestral category. If the data input of a scientific study consists
of racial designations based on self-identification and official ascription,
then the knowledge claim output of that study can only pertain to a social
category of race: e.g., “this bacteria is more prevalent in the microbiomes of
women who self-identify as ‘black,’ using U.S. Census categories.”
In addition to race and gender, another area of research is familial
relationships. Perhaps not surprisingly, microbiomes have been found to be
similar among family members (Ross et al. 2017), although the
methodological definition of ‘family’ in such studies raises ambiguities
about whether we are talking about a social or a biological construct similar
to those we have already raised about ‘race.’ Specifically, the operational
definition of family in this particular study—“10 cohabiting and sexually
active couples” consisting of “healthy heterosexual adults between the ages
of 20–49 years” who “had lived together for periods ranging from 4 months
to 14 years… in southwestern Ontario in Canada” (Ross et al. 2017, p.
11)—might be criticized as somewhat narrow definition of a ‘family.’ Be
that as it may, the claim of familial similarity reflects the interesting way in
which microbiomes undermine the usual dichotomy between genes and
environment. Microbiomes are at once thoroughly genetic and yet
profoundly environmental: they are to some extent inherited, but they also
reflect individuals’ life histories, environments, and the other bodies with
which they have regular contact. Some microbiologists have argued that
inheritance reflects more than the mere passing on of human genes, but also
of microbial genetic resemblances deriving, in part, from a more social
meaning of ‘family,’ i.e., from physical proximity and sharing the same
environment. Thus, “It appears that the microbiome blurs the line that
separates genetic and environmental forces acting on phenotypes”
8
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(Sandoval-Matta et al. 2017, p. 8).
Microbial family resemblances, however, revive in another form the
controversy over familial searching in forensic genetics (see, e.g., Haimes
2006; Murphy 2015). Like DNA profiles, microbiomes tell us not just about
an individual but about other people. In this sense, microbiome forensics
proposes to identify individuals based on their families. What is
racial/ethnic identification, if not that? And, of course, the microbiome is a
sort of interspecies ‘family’ itself: a collective of individual organisms and
different species that shares a common ‘home.’ But, as noted above,
microbiomes also destabilize the very notion of the individual itself. Is the
individual a human being colonized by microbes? Or is it a superorganism
composed of human microbial cells?
AQ3
Conclusion
It may be useful to try to place these developments in the context of the
history of forensic identification technologies. Fingerprint identification,
among the earliest and most successful of these techniques, established a
sort of template for the field by positing individualized identification as the
telos of such technologies. The ultimate goal was a biometric identifier that
would always be consistent within a human body and yet different from all
other human bodies (Kirk 1963).
As noted above, interest in collective identities, such as races, emerged
quickly. But group identification was relatively quickly abandoned, not
because it ‘didn’t work,’ but perhaps because it was not particularly useful
for law enforcement, certainly not as useful as individualized identification.
Perhaps also, group identification may have been perceived as a liability, a
needless distraction from the individualized identification project.
Hair microscopy may be characterized as one of those successor
technologies that molded itself in fingerprinting’s image, that aimed at the
telos posited by fingerprinting. But, hair microscopy was far from
discriminating enough to even approach individualized identification, and
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yet, bafflingly, went on to sometimes claim to have achieved it in court, at
least in the U.S. These reckless claims came home to roost only decades
later with the testimony review project. Its claims to individualized
identification collapsing, hair microscopy took refuge in collective
identification: even if claims to individualization were exaggerated and
unsustainable, surely even hair microscopy could achieve the assignment of
the population to three or four gross ‘races.’ Even these claims, now, appear
to have been abandoned.
But collective identification for hair, as for everything else, runs up against
the usual problems for collective identification: groups are too gross to be
meaningful; arbitrary boundaries create artificial groups out of difference
that exists along a continuum; assignments are made through self-
identification and official ascription; and the groups purport to be biological
(genotype) and yet seem to ‘really’ reflect “embodied race” (racialized
phenotype).
Genetic identification techniques at the outset were seen as the ultimate
enactment of the fingerprint paradigm: the notion that individual bodies
have biometric markers that are at once consistent within that individual
body and yet distinct from all other human bodies. Each cell within an
individual was supposedly genetically identical with each other cell within
that body and distinct from the assemblage of cells within all other bodies—
or at least very rare.
This was never entirely true. It was necessary to make exceptions for
homozygous twins, parasites, and chimerism (Martin 2007). The notion of
the genetically homogeneous body continues to erode, most recently with
findings about post-natal genetic differences in the brain cells even of a
single individual (Martone 2018). But microbiome forensics threatens to
explode this notion altogether. Microbiomes can distinguish identical twins,
of course, and microbial analysis does not treat the human body as an
undifferentiated whole—the microbiomes of different body areas will be
quite different. But microbiomes may do even more. Some have read the
microbiome as undermining the very distinction between the individual and
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the collective, and with it the status of ‘the human being’ as an individual or
even a unitary species. For example, Hutter et al. (2015) argue that “the
individuality of human beings is better conceived as a symbiotic entity… to
be human is to be multispecies.” So the human being is not merely a single
organism; it is not even a single species. Therefore, “we ought to consider,
for biological research purposes, that the single Homo sapiens is not in fact
the real biological individual.”
The critique of collective identities constructed around notions such as
‘race’—especially from the perspective of disciplines like anthropology or
evolutionary biology—has long been that collective identities such as race
are artificial constructs erected between two constructs that are seen as
more ‘real’: the individual and the species. Distinctions between species, it
was claimed, were indeed real, but distinctions between races were
arbitrary, false boundaries created within the species. The bounded,
internally homogeneous individual was likewise seen as real. What
appeared to some as a ‘race’ was in fact merely the wondrous manifestation
of the seemingly infinite potential for human variety. And yet, at the same
time, this variety obscured the high degree of sameness of all those
individuals within species (Marks 2002).
‘Race’ Marks (2015, p. 162) comments, “is a process of aggregating and
classifying people, creating bounded categories of difference where none
exist ‘out there.’” Many social scientists are used to thinking about race in
this way, but they are less accustomed to thinking about individuals or
species in this way. The individual and the species are treated as privileged;
indeed, fundamentally, they are conceived as the antidotes to racial
thinking. The species is what unites all humans across all supposed ‘races.’
And, individual differences between all humans, even within supposed
‘races,’ are what undermine the effort collect individuals into crude groups.
But what if the individual and the species are equally well “a process of
aggregating and classifying people, creating bounded categories of
difference where none exist ‘out there’”? The microbiome threatens to
undermine not just arbitrary racial categories, but all three types of identity
—individual, race, species—at once (e.g., Quammen 2018). Suddenly, not
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only is it absurd to consider race a biological phenomenon, but also nothing
is an individual or a species anymore. What is left is a multispecies mega-
collective that can be ‘identified’ by nothing more than ‘phylogenetic
similarity.’ Were this to be taken seriously, identification would no longer
rest on tendentious—and downright ontological—claims about the
biological homogeneity of individuals and their distinctness from all other
individuals. Rather, it would rest merely on measurements, in which species
and individuals are just bits of data in larger ‘big data’ collective. Perhaps,
then, we may soon do less of the familiar binary between individual and
collective and start doing something else, something more complicated but
that may yet afford greater opportunities for new thinking about what an
identity might consist of.
While such a future is interesting to imagine, there are good reasons to
believe neither the individual nor the collective will fade away quite so
easily. Indeed, the discourse around metagenomics illustrates the strong
desire to perceive both individuals and collectives—organisms, species,
etc.—even when the justification for these “central ontological categories”
has “raised concerns” (Dupré and O’Malley 2007, p. 842). That humans
tend to perceive biological things, including most notably other humans, in
terms of the collective is well known. It appears that may be true of the
individual as well.
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49/117 = 41.9%. 54/126 = 42.9%. These figures represent a preferable way of reporting the
data in the study than the characterization in the article:
The article  uses  the total  number of  subjects  in  the study (243) as  the
denominator,  rather  than  the  total  number  of  subjects  classified  as  a
particular  ‘race’  according  to  total  bifurcations,  thus  considerably
understating the “error rate.”
On September 1, 2016, I submitted a public comment on the draft ULTR—after the deadline
for public comment had closed, unfortunately—summarizing the argument made in this
article. I suggested that “The DOJ should consider discontinuing the practice of attributing
ancestry to hair. Alternatively, it should consult with the dermatological community on the
current thinking on this issue.” I make no causal claim about this action.
What this last item means is not clear, and the references listed by Kuiper are no help.
The 10:1 claim, however, turned out to be premature, and it has recently been revised
downward significantly and has been characterized as what Rekdal (2014) would call an
“academic urban legend” (Greshko 2016).
In a curious coincidence, the coiner of the term “metagenonics,” Jo Handelsman, went on to
serve as Associate Director for Science at the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy from 2014 to 2017. In that capacity, she made some important statements about the
importance of forensic reform (Handelsman 2015).
Even the use of the term ‘species’ in this context is imprecise. Some use the term ‘species
or taxa’ because it is incorrect or contested to refer to some forms of microbes, such as fungi
or viruses, as ‘species.’
In another comparative microbiome study of differences between geographic groups
(Yatsunenko et al. 2012), the researchers unselfconsciously mixed two geographic groups and
one ‘racial’ group. Two groups were defined by their country of residence: “residents of rural
Malawian communities, and inhabitants of USA metropolitan areas.” These groups were
compared to a group defined racially: “healthy Amerindians from the Amazonas of
Venezuela.” In the rest of the paper, the groups are describes as Malawian, Amerindian, and
USA, not, for example, Malawian, Venezuelan, and American.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
e.Proofing http://eproofing.springer.com/journals_v2/printpage.php?token...
44 of 44 11/20/18, 1:25 PM
